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On	  Standard	  and	  Taste	  
Wittgenstein	  and	  aesthetic	  judgment	  
Jean-­‐Pierre	  Cometti	  
It	   is	  not	  only	  difficult	   to	  describe	  what	  appreciation	  con-­‐
sists	  in,	  but	  impossible.	  To	  describe	  what	  it	  consists	  in	  we	  
would	  have	  to	  describe	  the	  whole	  environment.	  
Wittgenstein	  (1967):	  §20,	  p.	  7	  
The	   question	   of	   aesthetic	   judgment	   is	   the	   source	   of	   a	   mutitude	   of	   paradoxes	   that	  
marked	  the	  reflexion	  on	  art	  and	  arts	  themselves	  all	  along	  modern	  history.	  These	  para-­‐
doxes	  found	  a	  first	  evidence	  in	  a	  famous	  Hume's	  writing:	  On	  standard	  of	  taste	  (1757).	  In	  
the	  following	  remarks,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  investigate	  this	  issue	  using	  Wittgenstein's	  remarks	  
in	  his	  Cambridge	  lectures.	  I	  shall	  try	  to	  read	  hume	  in	  the	  light	  of	  Wittgenstein's	  remarks,	  
in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  the	  way	  Hume	  approached	  the	  question	  of	  taste	  –	  and	  perhaps	  al-­‐
so	  the	  way	  Kant	  dealed	  with	   it	  –	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  characteristic	  of	  difficulties	   that	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  intended	  to	  clarify	  in	  his	  philosophy.	  
In	  taking	  this	  way	  I	  hope	  to	  emphasize	  the	  originality	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  approach,	  and	  
enjoy	   its	   benefits	   not	   only	   for	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   special	   relationship	   be-­‐
tween	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  and	   the	  arts,	  but	  also	   in	   respect	  of	   the	  problems	  we	  
are	  used	   to	  meet	  everytime	  we	  are	  puzzled	  by	   the	  paradoxes	  of	   aesthetic	   evaluation:	  
how	  can	  we	  find	  some	  standard	  able	  to	  play	  a	  real	  normative	  function	  without	  deleting	  
what	  makes	  for	  us	  the	  very	  value	  of	  artworks?	  
1.	  Hume’s	  Problem	  
Judgment	  and	  evaluation	  are	  at	  stake	  in	  traditionnal	  questioning	  on	  art	  and	  works	  of	  art.	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  works	  exist	  as	  artworks	  only	  when	  they	  enter	  into	  relation	  with	  some	  
spectators,	  I	  mean	  with	  some	  «public»	  in	  the	  «public	  space»,	  and	  this	  condition	  makes	  
them	  «candidates	   for	   aesthetic	   appreciation».	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   this	   appreciation	   is	  
the	  only	  way	  of	  recognizing	  them,	  whether	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  their	  status	  or	  their	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value.	  The	  very	  concept	  of	  artwork	  involves	  such	  a	  recognition.	  An	  artwork	  that	  should	  
only	  exist	  either	   for	   its	  producer	  or	   in	   itself	   is	  a	  non-­‐sense.	  This	   is	  what	  makes	  the	  old	  
notion	  of	  aesthetic	  judgment	  valuable.	  It	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  viewer	  or	  the	  reader	  and	  
so	  on	  does	  not	  play	  a	  contingent	  part	  in	  what	  makes	  an	  «artefact»	  a	  «work	  of	  art»,	  un-­‐
like	  the	  various	  types	  of	  formalism	  or	  essentialism	  that	  separate	  artworks	  from	  any	  rela-­‐
tion	  to	  any	  public	  and	  any	  context.	  This	  is	  also	  what	  Hume	  and	  Wittgenstein	  assume	  in	  
their	  respective	  approach:	  they	  begin	  with	  aesthetic	  judgement,	  and	  therefore	  with	  this	  
relationship	   (Kant	   [1790]).	   Of	   course	   it	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   this	   is	   their	   only	   concern.	  
They	  extend	  their	  questioning	  to	  history	  or	  to	  cultural	  contexts	  for	  instance,	  but	  neither	  
Hume	  nor	  Wittgenstein	  –	  unlike	  many	  other	  authors	  –	  seems	  to	  be	  mainly	  or	  first	  inter-­‐
ested	  in	  creation	  or	  in	  the	  works	  from	  an	   intrinsic	  point	  of	  view,	  apart	  from	  any	  condi-­‐
tion	  of	  understanding	  and	  appreciation.	  
Of	  course	  these	  remarks	  don’t	  exhaust	  all	  the	  interest	  of	  such	  an	  idea.	  As	  we	  can	  see	  
through	  Hume’s	  reflections,	  and	  as	  this	  will	  be	  thematized	  later	  by	  Kant,	  aesthetic	  judg-­‐
ment	  —	  although	  subjective	  —	  has	  its	  conditions	  both	  in	  subjectivity	  and	  intersubjectivi-­‐
ty.	   This	   double	   dimension	   is	   what	   generates	   the	   well	   known	   paradoxes	   of	   aesthetic	  
judgment:	  subjectivity	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  essential	  dimension	  of	  it,	  even	  if	  it	  leads	  to	  rela-­‐
tivity	  in	  such	  matters;	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  we	  cannot	  imagine	  any	  standard	  —	  allowing	  to	  
escape	  the	  problem	  of	  relativism,	  even	  for	  taste	  —	  without	  assuming	  rules	  that	  cannot	  
be	   similar	   to	   those	   of	   a	  mechanism	  nor	   of	   nature,	   I	  mean	   rules	   equivalent	   to	   natural	  
laws.	  By	  the	  bye,	  we	  can	  perfectly	   imagine	  that	  what	  seems	  here	  puzzling	  comes	  from	  
the	  ambiguïties	  embedded	   in	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  the	  autonomy	  of	  arts	  
since	  eighteenth	  century.	  Nevertheless	  this	  is	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  here,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  main	  
concern	  of	  Hume’s	  writing	  and	  Wittgenstein’s	  remarks	  .	  
In	  other	  words	  —	  this	  is	  what	  I’ll	  call	  from	  now	  «the	  problem	  of	  Hume»	  —	  if	  we	  as-­‐
sume	   that	   artworks	   appealing	   to	   our	   appreciation	   (our	   taste)	   give	   rise	   to	   various	   and	  
even	  contradictory	  evaluations,	  how	  should	  we	  explain	  both	  these	  desagreements	  and	  
the	  agreements	  that	  we	  can	  observe	  about	  a	  lot	  of	  works,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  these	  works	  we	  
are	  used	  to	  call	  «masterpieces»?	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Hume	  as	  well	  as	  Wittgenstein	  approach	  this	  issue	  in	  a	  state	  of	  
mind	  contrasting	  with	  the	  way	  Kant	  deals	  with	  it	  later	  (as	  if	  we	  were	  dealing	  with	  an	  in-­‐
fortunate	   misunderstanding).	   For	   Hume	   the	   difficulties	   we	   face	   with	   about	   taste	   are	  
primarily	  the	  expression	  of	  false	  philosophical	  premises.	  This	  is	  what	  happens	  when	  phi-­‐
losophers	  make	   a	   distinction	   between	   feeling	   and	  understanding,	   and	   deduce	   from	   it	  
that	  in	  such	  a	  field	  contradictory	  judgments	  are	  equally	  and	  indifferently	  right	  —	  unlike	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to	   the	   cognitive	   judgments	   calling	   for	   understanding:	   «Among	   a	   thousand	   different	  
opinions	  which	  different	  men	  may	  entertain	  of	  the	  same	  subject,	  there	  is	  one,	  and	  but	  
one,	  that	  is	  just	  and	  true;	  and	  the	  only	  difficulty	  is	  to	  fix	  and	  ascertain	  it.	  On	  the	  contra-­‐
ry,	  a	  thousand	  different	  sentiments,	  excited	  by	  the	  same	  object,	  are	  all	  right:	  Because	  no	  
sentiment	  represents	  what	   is	  really	   in	  the	  object.	   It	  only	  marks	  a	  certain	  conformity	  or	  
relation	  between	  the	  object	  and	  the	  organs	  or	  faculties	  of	  the	  mind;	  and	  if	  that	  conform-­‐
ity	  did	  not	   really	  exist,	   the	   sentiment	  could	  never	  possibly	  have	  being»	   (Hume	   [1757]:	  
208).	  On	  this	  point,	  as	  Hume	  telles	  us	  also:	  «common	  sense,	  which	   is	   so	  often	  at	  vari-­‐
ance	   with	   philosophy,	   especially	   with	   the	   skeptical	   kind,	   is	   found,	   in	   one	   instance	   at	  
least,	  to	  agree	  in	  pronouncing	  the	  same	  decision»	  (Hume	  [1757]:	  209).	  
The	   way	   Hume	   emphasizes	   the	   part	   played	   by	   prejudices	   in	   such	   issues	   is	   on	   the	  
same	   level.	   But	  what	   is	   here	   outstanding	   is	   the	  way	   Hume	  —	   in	   the	   following	   of	   the	  
same	  text	  —	  appeals	  to	  common	  sense	  for	  taking	  relativity	  of	  taste	  in	  reverse	  hair,	  using	  
an	   argument	   based	   on	   general	   standards	   of	   appreciation	   whose	   evidence	   lies	   in	   our	  
general	  and	  usual	  appreciation	  of	  masterpieces.	  The	  type	  of	  agreement	  occuring	  in	  the-­‐
se	  cases	  cannot	  rest	  upon	  the	  only	  feeling	  of	  each	  one.	  The	  faculty	  that	  gives	  everyone	  
the	  opportunity	  of	  enjoy	  beauty	  in	  masterpieces	  like	  every	  other	  one,	  Hume	  call	  it	  «de-­‐
light»,	  but	  we	  could	  also	  call	  it	  discerning	  or	  discernment,	  since	  it	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  what	  
we	  call	  criticism.	  This	  is	  what	  Hume	  says	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  what	  it	  is:	  «Though	  it	  be	  cer-­‐
tain,	  that	  beauty	  and	  deformity,	  more	  than	  sweet	  and	  bitter,	  are	  not	  qualities	  in	  objects,	  
but	  belong	  entirely	  to	  the	  sentiment,	  internal	  or	  external;	  it	  must	  be	  allowed,	  that	  there	  
are	   certain	  qualities	   in	  objects,	  which	  are	   fitted	  by	  nature	   to	  produce	   those	  particular	  
feelings.	  Now	  as	  these	  qualities	  may	  be	  found	  in	  a	  small	  degree,	  or	  may	  be	  mixed	  and	  
confounded	  with	  each	  other,	   it	  often	  happens,	  that	  the	  taste	   is	  not	  affected	  with	  such	  
minute	  qualities,	  or	  is	  not	  able	  to	  distinguish	  all	  the	  particular	  flavours,	  amidst	  the	  disor-­‐
der,	   in	  which	  they	  are	  presented.	  Where	  the	  organs	  are	  so	  fine,	  as	  to	  allow	  nothing	  to	  
escape	  them;	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  so	  exact	  as	  to	  perceive	  every	  ingredient	  in	  the	  com-­‐
position:	  This	  we	  call	  delicacy	  of	  taste,	  whether	  we	  employ	  these	  terms	  in	  the	  literal	  or	  
metaphorical	  sense»	  (Hume	  [1757]:	  217).	  We	  remember	  that	  the	  exemple	  drawn	  from	  
Don	  Quichotte	  about	  the	  wine	  barrel	  and	  the	  key	  attached	  with	  a	  leader	  strap	  gives	  an	  
illustration	  of	  this	  fact.	  
Jean-­‐Pierre	  Cometti,	  On	  Standard	  and	  Taste 
pag.	  8	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  1/2013	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466 
2.	  Wittgenstein’s	  Problem	  
It	  is	  probably	  unnecessary	  to	  dwell	  any	  more	  on	  humean	  analyse	  of	  taste.	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  
that	  a	  skeptical	  philosopher	  could	  be	  at	  all	  satisfied	  by	  Hume’s	  suggestions,	  even	  if	  the	  
problem	   of	   Hume	   find	   its	   solution	   in	   «Human	   nature»,	   more	   than	   in	   some	   intrinsic	  
property	  to	  which	  the	  notion	  of	  delicatesse	  seems	  to	  refer.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  taste,	  Hume	  
should	  face	  with	  his	  own	  empiricism	  and	  its	  own	  presuppositions:	  the	  very	  source	  of	  our	  
feelings	  as	  well	  as	  our	   ideas,	  makes	  uneasy	  to	  understand	  the	  forms	  of	  agreement	   im-­‐
plied	   in	   human	   aesthetic	   experience.	   Nevertheless	   by	   introducing	   the	   part	   played	   by	  
rules	  in	  his	  investigation,	  Hume	  opens	  space	  to	  a	  position	  which	  is	  worth	  comparing	  to	  
Wittgenstein’s	  own	  way	  of	  investigating	  the	  question,	  for	  it	  gives	  us	  the	  opportunity	  of	  
better	  understand	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  Hume’s	  position	  and	  what	  are	  its	  limits	  —	  certainly	  
ambiguous	  and	  often	  misunderrsood.	  
Like	  Wittgenstein,	  Hume	  makes	  appeal	  to	  rules,	  because	  it	   is	  probably	  the	  only	  way	  
we	  have	  for	  understanding	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  an	  aesthetic	  judgment	  to	  be	  «right»:	  
«It	   is	  natural	   for	  us	   to	   seek	  a	   standard	  of	   taste,	   i.e.	   a	   rule	  by	  which	   the	  various	   senti-­‐
ments	  of	  men	  may	  be	  conciliated;	  at	   least,	   a	  decision,	  afforded,	   confirming	  one	   senti-­‐
ment	  an	  condemning	  another»	  (Hume	  [1757]:	  217).	  Such	  a	  common	  view	  occurs	  clearly	  
in	  the	  very	  idea	  which	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Hume’s	  reflection:	  some	  «standard»	  is	  necessarily	  
implied	   in	  matters	  where	  we	  have	  to	   judge	  of	  something.	  A	  «standard»,	   that	  means	  a	  
«criterium»	  or	  a	  «rule»	  without	  which	  there	  can	  be	  no	  judgment,	  but	  only	  reactions.	  But	  
what	  is	  not	  so	  clear	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  «delight».	  What	  is	  «dilight»,	  and	  in	  what	  sense	  is	  it	  
related	  to	  some	  rule?	  Moreover,	  does	   it	  not	  suppose	  some	  quality	   inside	   the	  object	   it-­‐
self,	  and	  what	  about	  the	  empiricism	  of	  Hume	  on	  this	  respect?	  This	  point	  gives	  certainly	  a	  
different	  sense	  to	  what	  Hume	  and	  Wittgenstein	  refer	  as	  «rule».	  It	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  give	  us	  
a	  better	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  exactly	  at	  stake	  in	  Hume’s	  position.	  
For	  Hume,	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  rule	   is	  subject	  to	  any	  possible	  agreement	  between	  
taste	   judgments,	   which	   is	   the	   condition	   under	  which	   the	   recognition	   of	  masterpieces	  
can	   be	   conceived	  without	   appearing	   as	   something	   absolutely	  mysterious	  —	   unless	   to	  
understand	  such	  an	  agreement	  as	  coming	  from	  arbitrary	  contingent	  conventions	  making	  
incomprehensible	  the	  durability	  of	  the	  admiration	  they	  generate	  in	  time.	  Of	  course	  that	  
does	  not	  entail	  that	  there	  cannot	  be	  differences	  between	  judgments	  and	  appreciations	  
—	  but	  except	  for	  masterpieces.	  Hume	  actually	  says	  —	  though	  he	  seems	  not	  to	  be	  entire-­‐
ly	  convinced	  —	  that	  taste	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  feeling	  ,	  and	  therefore	  that	  it	  involves	  the	  possi-­‐
bility	  of	  appreciations	  that	  should	  not	  be	  accountable	  to	  anyone	  —	  in	  other	  words	  they	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don’t	  need	  any	  justification.	  But	  they	  need	  a	  criterion,	  at	  least	  if	  disagreements	  have	  to	  
be	  overcome,	  and	  if	  we	  have	  to	  assume	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  common	  sense.	  
Wittgenstein’s	  position,	  though	  it	  seems	  close	  of	  Hume’s	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  open	  on	  
agreement,	   is	  not	   the	   same.	   First,	   the	  notion	  of	   a	  «correction	  norm»	   is	   related	   to	   the	  
idea	  of	  what	  makes	  a	   judgment	   right,	  and	  not	  mainly	   to	  an	   intersubjective	  agreement	  
(it’s	  a	  matter	  of	  accentuation);	  secondly	  —	  and	  I	  think	  that	  it	  is	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  
—	   Wittgenstein	   does	   not	   separate	   «rightness»	   and	   «judgment».	   It	   goes	   here	   as	   for	  
rules:	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  rule	  is	  necessarily	  to	  speak	  of	  rightness	  and	  wrongness.	  The	  outcome	  
is	  easy	  to	  find:	  if	  aesthetic	  judgment	  is	  problematic,	  it	  is	  because	  it	  incorporates	  in	  itself	  
the	  notion	  of	  a	  rule,	  so	  that	  the	  question	  it	  raises	  is	  not	  to	  know	  if	  it	  is	  able	  to	  overcome	  
the	  relativity	  of	  taste,	  but	  to	  know	  what	  is	  its	  status	  and	  how	  we	  can	  follow	  rules	  implied	  
in	  it.	  	  
What	  differs	  between	  Hume	  and	  Wittgenstein	   in	   this	   respect	  appears	  clearly	   in	   the	  
following	  passages.	  For	  Hume:	  «general	  rules	  of	  art	  are	  founded	  only	  on	  experience	  and	  
on	  the	  observation	  of	   the	  common	  sentiments	  of	  human	  nature»	   (Hume	  [1757]:	  218).	  
This	  means	  that	  they	  rest	  upon	  human	  nature,	  and	  upon	  what	  fits	  it.	  Moreover,	  for	  him,	  
what	  is	   implied	  here	  doesn’t	  pertain	  to	  knowkedge	  as	  such	  (he	  makes	  a	  distinction	  be-­‐
tween	  what	  pertains	   to	  knowledge	  and	  what	  pertains	   to	  criticism).	  For	  Wittgenstein	   it	  
goes	  differently:	  «In	  what	  we	  call	   the	  Arts	  a	  person	  who	  has	   judgement	  developes.	   (A	  
person	  who	  has	  a	   judgement	  doesn't	  mean	  a	  person	  who	  says	   'Marvelous!'	  at	   certain	  
things).	   If	  we	   talk	  of	  aesthetic	   judgements,	  we	   think,	  among	  a	   thousand	   things,	  of	   the	  
Arts.	  When	  we	  make	  an	  aesthetic	  judgement	  about	  a	  thing,	  we	  do	  not	  just	  gape	  at	  it	  and	  
say:	   "Oh!	  How	  marvellous!".	  We	  distinguish	  between	  a	  person	  who	   knows	  what	  he	   is	  
talking	  about	  and	  a	  person	  who	  doesn't»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1967]:	  §17,	  p.	  13).	  
In	  the	  first	  case	  the	  judgment	  rests	  upon	  experience	  and	  via	  experience	  upon	  human	  
nature;	   in	   the	   second	   one	   it	   refers	   to	   some	   kinds	   of	   learning	   and	   to	   the	   dispositions	  
(habits)	  that	  learning	  generates	  in	  human	  beliefs	  and	  desires.	  
3.	  What	  was	  Wrong	  by	  Hume	  	  
We	  can	  now	  grasp	  why	  Hume	  was	  wrong.	  Hume	  did	  not	  see	  —	  unlike	  Kant,	  it	  seems	  —	  
that	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  a	  standard	  of	  taste	  cannot	  be	  dissociate	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  
judgment,	  because	  there	  can	  only	  be	  judgment	  where:	  a)	  a	  condition	  of	  rightness	  (and	  
the	  possible	  occurrence	  of	  being	  wrong)	  is	  assumed	  ;	  b)	  a	  possible	  agreement,	  conceived	  
as	   an	   agreement	  with	   rule,	   is	   also	   assumed	  —	   excluding	   any	   «private»	   dimension.	   In	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other	  words,	  Hume	  seems	  to	   think	   the	   judgment	  as	  something	  private,	  and	   this	   is	   the	  
reason	  why	  he	  has	  to	  face	  with	  typical	  difficulties.	  From	  a	  certain	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  seems	  
that	   Kant	   understood	   very	   well	   what	   is	   wrong	   in	   Hume’s	   philosophy,	   and	   what	   it	   ig-­‐
nores.	   The	   famous	   distinction	   Kant	  makes	   between	   «beautiful»	   and	   «agreable»	   in	   his	  
third	   Critic	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   the	   expression	   of	   what	   requires	   the	   very	   notion	   of	  
judgment,	  namely	  a	  «norm	  of	  correction»	  that	  cannot	  depend	  only	  on	  feeling	  or	  human	  
nature.	   But	   Kant,	   though	   he	   went	   one	   step	   further,	   does	   not	   escape	   the	   difficulties	  
Hume	  met,	  since	  he	  appeared	  as	  not	  able	  to	  give	  non	  paradoxical	  definitions	  of	  beauty,	  
starting	  by	  this	  one:	  «everything	  is	  beautiful	  which	  pleases	  universally	  without	  any	  con-­‐
cept»	  (Kant	  [1790]:	  5,	  219,	  p.	  104).	  
Such	   paradoxes	  —	   to	   which	   are	   connected	   a	   lot	   of	   confusions	  —	   are	   not	   own	   to	  
Hume	  or	   to	  Kant,	   but	  we	  don’t	  need	   to	  dwell	   any	  more	  on	   this	  point.	  Wittgenstein	   is	  
significantly	   close	   to	   Kant	   when	   he	   claims	   that	   aesthetic	   adjectives	   have	   no	   use	   (i.e.	  
don’t	  have	  any	  objective	  ground),	  as	  he	  is	  also	  close	  to	  Hume	  in	  some	  of	  his	  remarks,	  but	  
he	  separates	  from	  him	  when	  he	  says	  that	  concerning	  aesthetics	  neither	  psychology	  nor	  
any	  appeal	   to	  causes	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  relevant.	  So	   it	   is	  actually	   the	  notion	  of	  rule	  
which	   plays	   the	   main	   part	   in	   Wittgenstein’s	   remarks,	   and	   this	   means	   that	   aesthetic	  
judgment,	  as	  such,	  has	  a	  normative	  value	  which	  makes	  it	  inseparable	  of	  the	  rules	  it	  im-­‐
plies.	  
Wittgenstein’s	  remarks	  in	  his	  Cambridge	  Lectures	  are	  clearly	  linked	  with	  the	  problem	  
of	  rule	  and	  following	  a	  rule.	  They	  corresponds	  to	  the	  main	  line	  of	  Philosophische	  Unter-­‐
suchungen	  —	  specially	   in	  §§	  126	  sq	  —	  I	  mean	  to	  what	  he	  assumes	  by	  saying	  that	  «the	  
meaning	  of	  a	   sentence	   is	   its	  understanding»,	  and	  with	  what	  he	  suggests	  about	  under-­‐
standing	  or	  following	  the	  rule,	  namely	  that	  «understanding»	  means	  «to	  be	  right»	  or	  to	  
follow	  a	  rule	  is	  to	  follow	  it	  rightly.	  Rightness	  (correction)	  is	  involved	  in	  «to	  understand».	  
This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  we	  could	  be	  inclined	  to	  think	  that	  «aesthetics»	  is	  no	  exception	  (to	  
rule):	  aesthetic	  appreciation	  or	  evaluation,	  as	  any	  appreciation,	  depends	  on	  rules.	  These	  
rules	   are	  what	  helps	   anyone	   to	  meet	  «claims»	  and	  expectations	   included	   in	   any	   judg-­‐
ment,	   and	   to	   say	   for	   instance:	  «too	  high	  or	   too	   low»	   (about	  a	  door),	   «more	   slowly	  or	  
more	  sustained»,	  «allegro,	  ou	  allegro	  ma	  non	  troppo»	  (about	  a	  melody),	  all	  these	  ways	  
of	  making	   something	   better	   or	  more	   relevant	   in	   such	   or	   such	   area	   (see	  Wittgenstein	  
[1967],	  14).	  Wittgenstein	  takes	  examples	   in	  architecture,	   in	  clothing	  or	  music,	  and	  this	  
seems	  to	  mean	  that	  for	  him	  the	  question	  of	  aesthetic	  judgment	  does	  not	  differ	  depend-­‐
ing	  on	  the	  artefacts	  we	  are	  dealing	  with,	  including	  art.	  And	  this	  could	  mean	  too	  that	  we	  
don’t	  have	  any	   reason	  –	  unlike	  Kant	  –	   to	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  «aesthetic	   judg-­‐
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ment»	  and	  «cognitive	  judgment».	  His	  thoughts	  on	  music,	  in	  many	  passages	  of	  his	  work,	  
advocates	   this	  conception	  of	  understanding	  and	  rightness.	   In	  other	  words,	   like	   for	  any	  
rule	  whatever	  it	  is,	  there	  can	  be	  any	  private	  application	  of	  a	  rule:	  to	  follow	  a	  rule	  entails	  
some	  norm	  of	  correction,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  a	  non-­‐sense	  to	  conceive	  such	  a	  process	  as	  a	  
private	  one.	  
A	  problem	  with	  this	  approcah	  lies	  in	  our	  inability	  to	  understand,	  as	  it	  occurs	  very	  of-­‐
ten,	  and	  in	  divergencies	  that	  appear	  between	  appreciations	  in	  different	  contexts	  or	  be-­‐
tween	  different	  individuals.	  Wittgenstein	  was	  certainly	  conscious	  of	  such	  a	  difficulty,	  as	  
it	  is	  suggested	  by	  some	  examples	  like	  reading	  some	  poem,	  specially	  when	  it	  appears	  that	  
slowly	  reading	  or	  fast	  reading,	  or	  reading	  with	  such	  or	  such	  a	  tone,	  don’t	  make	  the	  same	  
effect	  at	  all	  (see	  Wittgenstein	  [1967],	  §12,	  p.	  4).	  Here	  we	  could	  refer	  to	  Hume	  and	  con-­‐
cern	  ourselves	  with	  the	  distinction	  he	  makes	  between	  a	  general	  point	  of	  view	  on	  things	  
and	  a	  more	  detailed	  point	  of	  view.	  To	  understand	  «in	  general»	  and	  to	  undestand	  «in	  de-­‐
tail»	  is	  not	  the	  same.	  In	  a	  lot	  of	  cases	  and	  for	  many	  things	  a	  general	  view	  is	  enough;	  in	  
other	  cases,	  we	  must	  pay	  attention	  to	  detail	  for	  being	  really	  able	  to	  understand,	  and	  this	  
seems	  to	  mean	  that	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  understanding	  implying	  a	  lot	  of	  divergencies,	  
incompatibilities	  and	  ultimately	  of	  misunderstanding.	  
We	  guess	  that	  the	  reason	  of	  such	  a	  state	  of	  affair	  is	  not	  the	  variability	  and	  the	  incon-­‐
stancy	  of	  our	  feelings	  (pace	  Hume),	   in	  other	  words	  the	  the	  vagaries	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  
imagination,	  but	  rather	  the	  difficulty	  we	  meet	  for	  grasping	  the	  rule	  and	  to	  apply	  it.	  Every	  
art	  depends	  on	  rules;	  unless	  to	  ascribe	  them	  to	  nature,	  like	  kantian	  definition	  of	  «geni-­‐
us»,	  it	  is	  the	  same	  for	  appreciation.	  But	  what	  it	  is	  that	  makes	  we	  are	  puzzled,	  confused,	  
and	  unable	  to	  make	  a	  judgment	  in	  so	  many	  cases?	  There	  lies	  a	  common	  answer	  to	  this	  
question	  both	  in	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Hume.	  Hume	  suggests	  that	  habits	  play	  an	  important	  
part	  in	  aesthetic	  judgment,	  and	  also	  a	  lot	  of	  accidental	  variations.	  Wittgenstein	  goes	  fur-­‐
ther	  in	  emphasizing	  the	  important	  role	  of	  learning.	  His	  views	  on	  learning	  are	  not	  related	  
to	  some	  «human	  nature»	  as	  in	  Hume,	  not	  even	  to	  conventions	  ;	  they	  are	  connected	  with	  
a	  «form	  of	  life».	  It	  is	  this	  close	  link	  between	  appreciation,	  rules	  and	  learning	  in	  a	  shared	  
form	  of	   life	  that	  can	  explain	  both	  the	  role	  of	  rules	  and	  norms	  of	  correction,	  and	  in	  the	  
same	  way	  the	  difficulty	  we	  meet	  for	  finding	  the	  rule	  or	  the	  «right	  rule»,	  without	  assum-­‐
ing	  there	  is	  only	  one.	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4.	  The	  Paradigmatic	  «Masterpiece»	  
As	  it	  is	  suggested	  in	  conversations	  with	  Drury	  if	  to	  wear	  jewelery	  is	  for	  you	  surprising	  it	  is	  
probably	   because	   you	   are	   not	   used	   to	  wear	   such	   things.	   To	   use,	   to	   be	  used	   to,	   to	   be	  
taught	  are	  decisive	  in	  such	  matters.	  Man	  learns	  rules	  by	  applying	  them;	  the	  love	  of	  art,	  
the	  ability	  of	  to	  be	  pleased	  by	  it	  are	  matters	  of	  learning	  as	  well	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  swimm	  
or	  to	  read.	  It	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  –	  as	  both	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Hume	  suggest	  it	  –	  compari-­‐
sons	  play	  an	  important	  role	   in	  a	   lot	  of	  matters	  (see	  Hume	  [1757];	  Wittgenstein	  [1967]:	  
§9,	  p.	  20).	  	  
Could	  we	  think	  we	  have	  resolved	  the	  «problem	  of	  Hume»?	  In	  a	  certain	  sense	  we	  did.	  
Given	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  we	  raised	  it,	  this	  problem	  appears	  not	  to	  be	  different	  of	  what	  
Kripke	  asked	  about	  rules	  or	  what	  Nelson	  Goodman	  suggested	  about	  induction.	  Its	  solu-­‐
tion	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  a	  skeptical	  way	  –	  as	  Kripke	  wrongly	  believed,	  –	  in	  other	  words	  in	  con-­‐
ventional	   agreements	   analogous	   to	   the	   solution	   Locke	   tried	   to	   give	   to	   the	  problem	  of	  
language	  (Locke	  [1689],	  Book	  3:	  Of	  Words).	  Here	  again,	  we	  are	  not	  dealing	  with	  a	  «skep-­‐
tical	  problem»	  requiring	  a	  «skeptical	  solution».	  The	  way	  of	  escaping	  ourselves	  from	  per-­‐
plexities	  we	  endure	  lies	  in	  the	  conditions	  of	  applying	  rules,	  as	  Putnam	  (1983)	  suggested	  
it	   in	  his	   interpretation	  of	  Goodman's	  «New	  enigma	  of	   induction».	  Let	  me	  nevertheless	  
observe	  that	  Hume’s	  position,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  a	  skeptical	  one,	  ascribes	  a	  strange	  role	  to	  the	  
idea	  of	  conformity	  between	  (the	  content	  of)	  appreciation	  (judgment)	  and	  its	  object.	  As	  it	  
would	  be	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  that	  the	  author	  of	  the	  Treatise	  of	  Human	  Nature	  assumes	  a	  
special	  way	  of	  knowing	  (by	  feeling)	  the	  intrinsic	  qualities	  of	  objects,	  we	  should	  ask	  what	  
does	  he	  mean	  by	  this	  kind	  of	  «conformity».	  I	  would	  like	  to	  approach	  this	  question	  from	  
two	  points	  of	  view:	  a)	   in	  terms	  of	  agreement;	  b)	   in	  terms	  of	  what	  we	  are	  able	  to	  draw	  
from	  this	  discussion	  about	  the	  status	  of	  masterpieces.	  
One	  significant	   feature	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  consists	   in	  what	  closely	   links	  under-­‐
standing	  a	  work	  of	  art	  (but	  it	  could	  also	  be	  the	  case	  for	  an	  artefact	  or	  for	  nature)	  and	  the	  
deep	   familiarity	  we	   feel	  with	   it,	   up	   to	  erase	  what	  distinguishes	   subject	   and	  object.	   To	  
understand,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  also	  understanding	  himself	  and	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  this	  under-­‐
standing.	   Metaphysical	   and	  mystical	   speculations	   which	   aesthetic	   experience	   is	   often	  
subject	  have	  probably	  their	  source	  in	  the	  confusion	  that	  dominates	  this	  feeling	  (we	  can	  
think	  of	  Musil’s	  andere	  Zustand;	  Musil	  [1930-­‐33]).	  Such	  an	  agreement	  –	  «resonance»	  –	  
has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  any	  «conformity»	  or	  «correspondance»	  —	  except	  in	  a	  baudeleri-­‐
an	  sense	  may	  be	  —	  like	  the	  one	  we	  are	  used	  to	  ascribe	  as	  a	  rule	  to	  cognitive	  judgments.	  
We	  should	  rather	  see	   it	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  what	  our	  dispositions	   (our	   faculties	  of	  un-­‐
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derstanding	   and	   feeling)	   have	   inherited	   from	   a	   common	   form	   of	   life.	   As	  Wittgenstein	  
suggested	  it,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  music	  you	  should	  also	  know	  that	  in	  our	  culture	  chil-­‐
dren	   too	   can	   give	   concerts.	  Understanding	  here	  —	   think	  of	   the	   type	  of	   relationship	   it	  
supposes	  between	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  and	  what	  it	  refers	  –	  has	  its	  background	  in	  what	  I	  call	  
«conditions	  of	  art»	   (and	   learning)	   (see	  Cometti	   [2012]).	  Do	   they	  belong	   to	   the	   field	  of	  
rules?	  Here	   I	  must	  turn	  to	  a	  point	  that	   I	   first	   left	  out.	  As	  Brandom	  (1994)	  suggested	   it,	  
Rules	  should	  not	  be	  identified	  with	  the	  explicit	  status	  they	  have	  in	  our	  usual	  representa-­‐
tion.	  To	  learn	  rules	  is	  to	  behavior	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  our	  behaviors	  can	  make	  sense	  for	  
others,	   beyond	   the	   special	   rules	   that	   are	   learned	   explicitly.	   In	   rules,	   there	   are	   much	  
more	  rules	  that	  we	  are	  led	  to	  believe.	  It	  is	  exactly	  what	  happens	  in	  aesthetic	  matters:	  for	  
the	  most	  part	   rules	  don’t	  have	  an	  explicit	   status;	   they	  become	   such,	  but	  without	  ever	  
exhaust	  the	  whole	  field	  they	  belong.	  This	   is	  what	  is	   involved	  in	  understandig	  a	  work	  of	  
art,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  agreement	  within	  such	  an	  understand-­‐
ing.	  
Certainly	  Hume	  does	  not	  suggest	  anything	  like	  that,	  but	  his	  point	  of	  view	  is	  not	  so	  far	  
from	  such	  an	   idea,	  specially	  when	  he	  speaks	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  what	  we	  feel	  
and	  what	  about	  we	  feel	  it,	  or	  when	  he	  takes	  into	  account	  cultural	  backgrounds	  and	  the	  
part	  they	  have	  in	  experience.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  «problem	  of	  Hume»	  is	  not	  a	  skeptical	  
problem,	  and	   it	  may	  be	   that	   it	   sheds	  a	   spacial	   light	  on	  what	  we	  call	   a	  masterpiece.	   In	  
Hume	  Argument,	  this	  notion	  helps	  to	  discover	  the	  necessity	  of	  rule	  (standard)	  for	  over-­‐
coming	   the	   relativity	  of	   taste.	   Some	  philosophers	  as	   Levinson	   (2002)	   relates	   this	  argu-­‐
ment	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  some	  «ideal	  critic».	  I	  think	  that	  we	  rather	  should	  see	  in	  it	  an	  answer	  
to	   the	  question:	  «What	   is	  a	  masterpiece?».	  Such	  a	  notion	  was	  hardly	  attaqued	  by	   the	  
avant-­‐garde,	  but	  how	   to	  explain	   the	  unanimity	  existing	  around	  certain	  works	  all	   along	  
the	  history?	  This	   is	   the	   core	  of	  Hume’s	  argument.	   There	  are	   two	   types	  of	  answers	   for	  
such	  a	  question.	  The	  first	  is	  «formal»;	  it	  rests	  upon	  the	  idea	  of	  some	  achievment	  whose	  
works	  of	  art	  should	  be	  the	  formal	  expression,	  and	  upon	  an	  idea	  of	  perfection	  as	  an	  ideal	  
nobody	  ever	  met.	  A	  second	  one,	  because	  it	  moves	  the	  issue	  towards	  reception,	  is	  con-­‐
cerned	  with	  contents	  and	  effects	  upon	  a	  public,	  with	  what	  it	  perceives	  and	  recognise	  in	  
works,	   in	   relation	  with	   its	   interests,	   believes,	   values,	  memory,	   and	   so	  on,	   implied	   in	   a	  
form	  of	  life.	  
This	  kind	  of	  answer	  is	  the	  type	  we	  can	  find	  in	  Hume	  and	  in	  Wittgenstein	  (although	  it	  
is	   not	   exactly	   the	   same	   under	   many	   aspects).	   A	   masterpiece	   is	   actually	   not	   an	   un-­‐
reacheable	  ideal,	  as	  it	  is	  assumed	  by	  modern	  art,	  marked	  by	  the	  figure	  of	  genius.	  Actual-­‐
ly	  we	  call	  «masterpiece»	  a	  human	  product	  speaking	  for	  the	  whole	  humanity,	  depending	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on	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  life	  it	  expresses	  in	  itself,	  and	  their	  variations	  in	  space	  and	  time.	  
The	  agreement	  that	  masterpieces	  arouse	  is	  the	  mark	  of	  a	  recognition,	  in	  the	  two	  senses	  
of	  this	  word.	  The	  role	  played	  by	  understanding	  and	  the	  insertion	  of	  human	  products	  in	  a	  
form	  of	  life	  pertain	  to	  the	  first;	  the	  part	  played	  by	  consensus	  against	  the	  caprices	  of	  sub-­‐
jectivity	  pertains	  to	  the	  second.	  
Let	  me	  quote	  a	  very	  relevant	  paper	  on	  this	  subject,	  from	  Ricardo	  Erbalucia,	  refering	  
to	  Frank	  Kermode:	  «“Boticelli”,	   explains	  Kermode	  at	   the	  end	  of	  a	   careful	  historical	   re-­‐
construction,	  “became	  canonical	  not	  through	  scholarly	  effort	  but	  by	  chance,	  or	  rather	  by	  
opinion”.	  When	  the	  Spring	  and	  The	  Birth	  of	  Venus	  (Pictures	  4	  and	  5)	  emerged	  after	  cen-­‐
turies	  of	  darkness,	   they	  were	  placed	   in	  1815	   in	   the	  Gallery	  of	  Trades	   in	  Florence,	   they	  
started	  to	  be	  noticed	  by	  visitors	  and,	   little	  by	  little,	  not	  only	  these	  pieces	  started	  to	  be	  
admired,	  but	  also	  the	  frescos	  on	  the	  side	  walls	  of	   the	  Sistine	  Chapel	   (Picture	  6),	  which	  
have	   been	   unnoticed	   next	   to	  Michelangelo’s	   paintings.	   The	   interest	   in	   Botticelli	   grew	  
faster	  than	  the	  study	  of	  his	  works,	  placing	  him	  in	  a	  much	  more	  privileged	  place	  before	  
Ruskin,	  Pater,	  Herbert	  Horne	  and	  Abby	  Warburg	  made	  him	  the	  object	  of	  study.	  The	  pub-­‐
lic	  in	  the	  museums	  and	  in	  the	  incipient	  market	  of	  reproductions	  demanded	  an	  art	  previ-­‐
ous	  to	  the	  Renaissance	  and	  Botticelli	  made	  it,	  paving	  the	  way	  to	  Pre-­‐Raphaelite	  painters	  
and	  the	  “aesthetical	  movement”	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century,	  which	  transformed	  the	  mel-­‐
ancholic	  beauty	  of	   its	   ladies	   in	   fashion.	  The	  Nachleben	  by	  Botticelli	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
new	   “form	   of	   attention”,	   Kermode	   alleges:	   “Enthusiasm	   counted	   for	   more	   than	   re-­‐
search,	  opinion	  for	  more	  than	  the	  knowledge”»	  (Ibarlucia	  [2012];	  see	  Kermode	  [1985],	  
30).	  
The	  conditions	  that	  divert	  us	  from	  such	  an	  evidence	  depends	  for	  a	  large	  part	  on	  the	  
gap	   that	   was	   digged	   between	   art	   and	   life.	   Formalism,	   art	   for	   art’s	   sake,	   contributed	  
powerfully	  to	  such	  a	  situation.	  To	  this	  respect,	  Hume	  and	  Wittgenstein	  stand	  in	  a	  mar-­‐
ginal	  position.	  Hume	  was	  writing	  at	  a	  time	  which	  had	  not	  yet	  established	  artistic	  auton-­‐
omy;	  on	  the	  contrary	  Wittgenstein	  was	  deeply	  influenced	  by	  ideas	  we	  can	  take	  as	  char-­‐
acteristic	   of	   this	   status,	   but	   his	   philosophy	   is	   paradoxically	   one	   of	   the	   best	  means	  we	  
have	  to	  free	  ourselves	  from	  the	  mythologies	  that	  the	  autonomous	  status	  of	  art	  has	  gen-­‐
erated.	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